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The current consensus is thot most notural categories are not organized around 
strict definitions (a list of singly necessary ond jointly sufficient features) but 
rather according t.a a fomily resemblance (FR) principle: Objects belong to the 
same category because they are similor to each other and dissimilar to obfects in 
contrast categories. A number of computational models of category construction 
hove been developed to provide an’account of how and why people create FR 
categories (Anderson. 1990; Fisher, 1987). Surprisingly, however, only o few 
experiments on category construction or free sorting have been run and they sug- 
gest that people do not sort examptes by the FR principle. We report several new 
experiments and a two-stage model for category construction. This model is con- 
trasted with a variety of other models with respect to their ability to account for 
when FR sorting will and will not occur. The experiments serve to identify one 
basis for FR sorting and to support the two-stage model. The distinctive property 
of the two-stage model is that it assumes that people impose more structure than 
the examples support in the first stage and thot the second stage adjusts for this 
difference between preferred and perceived structure. We speculate that people 
do not simply ossimilate probabilistic structures but rather organize them in 
terms of discrete structures plus noise. 
People both learn about preexisting categories and create new categories on 
their own. For example, one may construct categories such as, “my favorite 
movies, ” or “different types of college students I have known.” Certainly, 
formal education provides or imposes other categories. Furthermore, there 
may be intermediate cases. For example, children may learn many natural 
object categories by being taught, but NeIson (1974) raised the alternative 
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possibility that children construct their own categories first and then learn 
which labels apply to them rather than using the labels to form the categories. 
Category construction needs to be highly constrained because the num- 
ber of ways of partitioning unclassified objects grows exponentially with a 
linear increase in the number of objects. For example, one can partition 3 
objects in 5 ways, 4 objects in 15 ways, 5 objects in 52 ways, and 10 objects 
in more than 100,000 ways. Considering the number of objects in the world, 
it is clear that our categories constitute only the tiniest subset of all possible 
partitionings. Therefore, the question of what principles determine how 
categories are constructed is an important one that ought to give us some 
insight into how the mind works. 
Presumably, human categorization reflects the interaction of human goals 
and conceptual capabilities with the information and structure available in 
the environment. Indeed, the historical shift from the idea that categories 
follow strict definitions (the so-called classical view, Bruner, Goodnow, & 
Austin, 1956; Katz & Postal, 1964) to the idea that concepts are structured 
around prototypes that are only generally true of category examples (the 
probabilistic view) was motivated by a detailed analysis of natural object 
categories (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 
1974; Smith & Medin, 1981). Associated with this analysis has been the idea 
that mental representations of categories closely mirror the structure afforded 
by properties of category examples. For example, the ideas that natural 
object categories are organized around prototypes and that membership 
judgments are based on the similarity of examples to prototypes are nicely 
compatible with fuzzy or probabilistic category structures. 
Although much attention has focused on classification processes associ- 
ated with preexisting categories, there has been a recent interest in principles 
of category construction. Different theories of category construction have 
tended to agree on two central assumptions. One assumption is that the 
computations associated with category construction (and category represen- 
tations, where this description is appropriate) mirror the structure afforded 
by examples. That is, one goal has been to account for, or to be able to re- 
produce, fuzzy or family resemblance (FR) categories. An allied assumption 
has been that principles of category construction at the level of cultures, as 
reflected in natural object categories, also apply at the level of individuals. 
Specifically, it has been assumed that given the opportunity, individuals will 
create FR categories (Rosch, 1975). 
Very few category-construction or free-sorting experiments have been 
carried out to see whether and when people create FR categories. The evi- 
dence that exists suggests that people do not find it natural to sort by an FR 
principle (e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987). Before discussing 
this evidence, we need to describe category-construction theories in more 
detail because they help define just exactly what is meant by FR. 
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The organization of this article is as follows. We first review current 
category-construction theories. Next, we describe a two-stage model of FR 
sorting which implies that category representations do more than mirror the 
structure of examples. Finally, we evaluate how well these theories account 
for when FR sorting will and will not occur in experiments where people are 
asked to create categories. 
CATEGORY-CONSTRUCTION THEORIES 
Similarity-Based Models 
Traditionally, similarity among objects has been considered the basis for 
category construction: Objects are thought to belong to the same class 
because they are similar to each other (Rosch, 1978). Although Rosch did 
not offer a specific similarity-based model for category construction, Rosch 
suggested that people would sort examples into categories so as to maximize 
within-category similarity and minimize between-category similarity 
(Rosch, 1975). Several similarity-based clustering models have been devel- 
oped in statistics and pattern recognition. Basically, they represent similarity 
in terms of distance in some multidimensional space. The dimensions of the 
space correspond to the dimensions from which the exemplars are composed. 
The overall similarity between objects is an inverse function of their dis- 
tance in the dimensional space. Although these models have not generally 
been proposed as psychological process models, they do represent ways of 
instantiating similarity-based clustering. 
In general, there are two classes of similarity-based models: One creates 
hierarchical categories and the other creates nonhierarchical categories. 
Nonhierarchical categories are created by repeating the process of selecting 
prototypes, assigning exemplars based on the similarity to the prototypes, 
and recalculating the prototypes. Hierarchical categories are created either 
by treating all the exemplars as belonging to one category and splitting it 
until all the categories have only one member (the so-called divisive method) 
or by treating each example as a category itself and combining the two most 
similar categories until there is only one category (the so-called agglomera- 
tive method; see Anderberg, 1973; Massart & Kaufman, 1983, for reviews). 
These models are statistical tools designed to place objects into clusters 
suggested by the data and have not yet been proposed as psychological 
models. Although the actual processing assumptions may not be psycho- 
logically valid, the basic philosophy behind these methods is the same as 
Rosch’s: Categories are formed as a function of between-category and 
within-category similarity. 
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Predictibility-Driven Models 
Another class of category-construction models focuses on maximizing the 
inference potential of categories. These models will be called predictibility- 
driven models. The idea is that the better we can predict unknown features 
based on category membership, the more advantageous it is to create such a 
category (Anderson, 1990). For example, it may be advantageous to create a 
category of “my friends” because knowing that a person is a friend, one 
can predict a variety of behaviors such as willingness to loan books or read 
drafts of papers. On the other hand, “red things” may not be a very useful 
category because knowing that an object is red does not tell us much else 
about the object. 
In general, the predictibility-driven models will be sensitive to the number 
of features shared among objects, and therefore, they will tend to make the 
same predictions as the similarity-based models. The more specific nature 
of these models will be investigated in our experiments by running simula- 
tion programs on particular sets of exemplars. This section will present two 
predictibility-driven models existing in the field; Anderson’s rational model 
of induction and Fisher’s COBWEB. 
Anderson’s ModeI (1988, 1990, 1991). Anderson pointed out that one 
can specify an ideal algorithm that keeps track of all possible partitions to 
select the partition with the maximum predictability. But as he pointed out, 
that kind of model is implausible as a model of human behavior because of 
computational limitations as the number of objects and/or features grows 
large. This ideal algorithm could not even be run on a computer because 
there are too many possible partitionings. As an alternative, Anderson pro- 
posed an iterative algorithm in which new exemplars are considered incre- 
mentally and classified into the category that maximizes the predictability 
of the resulting partitioning. For each new example, two kinds of probabili- 
ties are calculated; the probabilities of the new object coming from old 
categories and the probability of creating a new category. The probability 




where n is the number of objects so far, ?ZK is the number of objects in cate- 
gory K so far, CKi is the number of objects in category K so far with the 
same value on the ith dimension as the object to be classified, mi is the 
number of values on dimension i, and c is a free parameter representing the 
probability that any two objects will be in the same category, which is called 
the coupling probability. 
The probability of the object coming from a new category (PO) is 
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l-c 1 
pcJ= (I-c)+cn 21 mi. 
The new object is assigned to existing categories if PO is smaller than PK or 
to the new category if PO is greater than PK. 
Anderson showed that his model will construct FR categories and will 
tend to construct categories at the basic level (i.e., the most useful level in 
the generalization hierarchy of categories, Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, 
& Boyes-Braem, 1976). Anderson’s model is consistent with this phenomenon 
in that it creates basic-level categories with the widest range of the coupling 
parameter (c in the preceding equations) values. 
COBWEB. Fisher (1987) developed a clustering system, COBWEB, using 
category utility, a measure proposed by Gluck and Corter (1985) as an index 
of the basic level. Category utility is a function of the base rate of features, 
category validity (i.e., probability of a feature given a category), and cue 
validity (i.e., probability of a category given a feature). COBWEB takes 
each example incrementally and compares the category utility of placing the 
example in each of the existing categories with the category utility of creating 
a new category. The example is placed in the category (either new or old) that 
results in the highest category utility. 
Both Anderson’s model and COBWEB are incremental clustering algo- 
rithms and produce different types of partitionings depending on the input 
order. COBWEB tries to reduce this order effect by splitting and merging 
the old partitionings every time a new example is entered. Due to computa- 
tional complexity, however, calculating category utility over all the old 
examples is done only approximately, and therefore, the system may remain 
sensitive to input order. 
Neither of these models was proposed as a process model of human cate- 
gory construction. The basic processes of the two models are the same except 
for the difference in the clustering criteria. Although the specifics of the 
clustering criteria differ, the main idea for developing the criteria is essen- 
tially the same: maximizing predictibility. 
Maximizing Comprehensibility 
Michalski and Stepp (1983) proposed a clustering system, CLUSTER/2, 
which tries to construct concepts that can be described in simple terms. Such 
classifications would facilitate comprehension of the observations and the 
subsequent use of them. Unlike the models described in the earlier section, 
CLUSTER/2 does not use a measure of overall similarity as a basis for cate- 
gorization. Instead, the main goal of CLUSTER/2 is to generate hierarchical 
categories that can be described by a single conjunctive concept. Categories 
at the same level of the hierarchy should have logically disjoint descriptions 
86 AHN AND MEDIN 
and optimize a set of clustering criteria, one of which is the simplicity of a 
concept. The simplicity of a concept is a function of the number of descriptors 
for the concept. Other clustering criteria include the ratio between the number 
of observed objects of a concept and the number of possible but unobserved 
objects covered by the concept, and the intercluster difference called the dis- 
crimination index (the number of variables having different values in every 
cluster description; see Michalski & Stepp, 1983). 
Because CLUSTER/2 produces disjoint categories described with a single 
conjunctive concept, the system seems to prefer categories with defining 
features. CLUSTER/Z, therefore, is unlikely to produce FR categories. The 
way it deals with examples that do not admit simple definitions will be shown 
as we describe specific experiments. 
INCREMENTAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS SORTING 
The models reviewed so far can be classified in terms of whether they use in- 
cremental or simultaneous clustering methods. The two predictibility-driven 
models presented earlier are incremental clustering models where examples 
are sorted one by one. But the similarity-based models and CLUSTER/2 
use a procedure in which examples are to be sorted all at once (i.e., simulta- 
neous sorting). Also, the current experiments and the empirical studies that 
will be described later use simultaneous sorting tasks. In this article, we 
compare results from the sequential sorting models with the results from 
simultaneous sorting tasks. Therefore, it seems important to clarify the dif- 
ferences between the two types of sorting tasks and justify our comparison. 
On one hand, incremental sorting has advantages such as computational 
tractability and its ability to update the knowledge base as new examples are 
seen (Anderson, 1988, 1990; Fisher, 1987; Fisher & Langley, 1986; Langley, 
Kibler, & Granger, 1986). On the other hand, incremental systems can be- 
come too sensitive to skewed input order and produce biased partitionings. 
To handle this problem, Anderson and Matessa (1991) developed a hier- 
archical algorithm, which turned out to be somewhat more independent of 
presentation order. But (as they noted), no rational grounds (e.g., increased 
predictability) exist for using the hierarchical algorithm over the nonhier- 
archical one. COBWEB’s solution to the order effect was to merge or split 
existing categories every time a new instance was entered. Therefore, COB- 
WEB’s partitionings may be comparable to simultaneous sorting. 
In addition, even in simultaneous sorting situations, subjects may examine 
examples one by one. Therefore, simultaneous sorting can be considered a 
special case of incremental sorting where input order is randomized across 
subjects. In order to make sequential models as comparable to simultaneous 
models as possible with respect to our sorting task, sequential sorting models 
were tested with randomized presentation order over 50 trials in the current 
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TABLE 1 
Abstract Notation of Stimuli Used in Medin, Wottenmaker, and Hompson (1987). 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
Dl 02 D3 D4 Dl D2 D3 D4 
El 1 1 1 1 E6 0 0 0 0 
E2 1 1 1 0 E7 0 0 0 1 
E3 1 1 0 1 EB 0 0 1 0 
E4 1 0 1 1 E9 0 1 0 0 
E5 0 1 1 1 El0 1 0 0 0 
study. Using multiple presentation orders for the models may serve as a 
rough approximation to simultaneous sorting. This procedure will be fully 
described in the following. 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CATEGORY CONSTRUCTION 
Only a few experiments have used sorting tasks (either sequential or simul- 
taneous) to evaluate category-construction theories. The general finding in 
free-sorting experiments is that people tend to sort exemplars on the basis of 
values along one dimension (Imai dc Garner, 1965, 1968; Medin, Watten- 
maker, & Hampson, 1987). 
For example, Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987) found that 
subjects did not create categories according to the FR principle even when 
the examples were structured around prototypes. Subjects in their experi- 
ments received several exemplars, including two prototypes that differed 
from each other along all the component dimensions, and additional exem- 
plars that were minimal distortions of a given prototype. The abstract nota- 
tion for the 10 stimulus items presented in those experiments is shown in 
Table 1. (The first column indicates the exemplar label and the next four 
columns indicate the value on each dimension for the example.) The 10 ex- 
emplars are arranged in two cohrmns, indicating FR partitioning for this set. 
Rosch (1975) suggested that when asked to sort examples linked by over- 
all similarity (as in these stimuli), people would tend to organize categories 
around the prototypes and produce FR categories. However, almost all of 
the subjects in Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson’s experiment created 
categories on the basis of a single dimension. For example, if the first dimen- 
sion was used by a subject, El, E2, E3, E4, and El0 were grouped together 
and the rest were grouped together. This tendency for unidimensional (l-D) 
sorting held across a variety of stimuli, instructions, and procedures. 
FR sorting did not emerge even when 1-D sorting was prevented. In one 
study, Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987) used trinary-valued 
stimuli and required people to sort examples into two categories (see Table 2 
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TABLE 2 
Abstract Notation of Stimuli Used in Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987). 
Experiment 4 
Dl D2 D3 D4 Dl D2 D3 D4 
El 0 0 0 0 E7 1 1 2 2 
E2 0 0 0 1 E8 1 2 1 2 
E3 0 0 1 0 E9 2 1 2 1 
E4 1 0 1 0 El0 2 2 2 1 
ES 1 1 0 0 Eil 2 2 1 2 
E6 0 1 0 1 El2 2 2 2 2 
for the abstract notations of the stimuli). Under these conditions, a small 
number of FR sortings was observed, but none of the subjects’ descriptions 
were consistent with an FR explanation. Several sorting strategies were 
observed and the ones used by a majority of the subjects suggested that sub- 
jects first looked for a primary dimension to divide most of the stimuli. For 
example, they used just a single dimension (e.g., “long tail in general” vs. 
“short tail in general”), primary dimension plus conjunction (e.g., “four 
legs, or eight legs and a square head”), or primary dimension plus disjunc- 
tion (“triangle-shaped head or more than eight legs”). These descriptions 
suggest that people tend to create categories with defining features and if 
the strategy does not work for some exceptional examples, they tend to 
patch them up by adding descriptions for the leftover examples. This kind 
of strategy could, in some cases, yield categories with FR structure. 
The preceding analysis assumes that the descriptions given by the partici- 
pants reveal the process by which they constructed categories. It is possible, 
however, that the FR sorting was “genuine” and that the descriptions were 
generated after the sorting. Consequently, one needs a more direct experi- 
mental comparison to distinguish true FR sorting (i.e., sorting corresponding 
to the similarity-based or predictability-driven models just described) from 
FR sorting that emerges as a by-product of other category-construction 
principles. 
In order to provide a proper experimental contrast, we need to formalize 
the idea that people are looking for more simple structure than the examples 
afford. The general notion is that when faced with probabilistic structures, 
people construct a simple core or primary basis for classification and then 
adjust for examples that do not conform to the core. We first describe this 
two-stage model and then outline the experimental contrasts aimed at evalu- 
ating it. 
A TWO-STAGE MODEL FOR CATEGORY CONSTRUCTION 
The two-stage model of category construction was developed to capture 
people’s tendency to construct categories by focusing on a primary feature, 
as shown in the Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987) experiments. In 
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the model’s first stage, the most salient dimension of the exemplars (e.g., 
size) is selected. (What determines salience of dimensions is beyond the 
scope of the model.) Then the exemplars are divided into the desired number 
of groups (e.g., 2) according to extreme values along the selected dimension 
(e.g., small vs. large). If the dimension is not continuous, then the most 
common values are selected to be defining features of initial categories. For 
example, if there are four squares, four circles, and two triangles, and the 
task is to create two categories, then the two categories in the first stage 
would consist of four squares in one group and four circles in the other group. 
The second stage involves classifying the remaining exemplars that do 
not have an extreme value on the dimension (e.g., medium), or the ones that 
do not have the most common values. These remaining exemplars are cate- 
gorized into one of the initially created groups depending on their overall 
similarity to each group. The judgement of overall similarity involves all the 
dimensions in the exemplars. 
A few additional comments on the assumptions about the second stage 
are needed. The main point of the two-stage model is that people prefer 
imposing a simple structure to judging overall similarity in category con- 
struction. Although we initially assumed that people would classify the 
remaining exemplars based on their overall similarity to the initially created 
categories, the model allows various second-stage strategies. Besides com- 
paring the exemplars based on overall similarity in the second stage, the 
subjects may classify the remaining exemplars based on the similarity along 
only the most salient dimension selected in the first stage. For example, 
suppose the subjects initially created small versus large categories and the 
remaining exemplars had medium size. Then subjects may compare the 
similarity of medium to large and medium to small, and place the remaining 
exemplars in the more similar category. The various strategies that may be 
used in the second stage do not seem to be important for the description of 
the two-stage model because the primary claim of the model is that people 
first create classical categories and then somehow deal with remaining 
exceptions. 
The two-stage model readily explains Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hamp- 
son’s (1987) 1-D sorting results. The sets of exemplars used in their experi- 
ments required an FR sorting to be based on c+racteristic features (i.e., 
features that are generally true for a category but not sufficient for the cate- 
gory). According to the two-stage model, these exemplars do not even have 
to pass through the second stage of the model to be classified into two groups 
because all the exemplars consist of binary values. Whichever dimension is 
selected as the most salient one, exemplars with characteristic values of a 
contrasting category on the salient dimension will be grouped with the mem- 
bers of the contrasting category, resulting in 1-D sorting. 
This explanation would suggest that the basis for category construction is 
some kind of interactin of processing biases with the structure of the stimuli. 
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TABLE 3 
Abstract Notation of Set A 
Dl D2 D3 D4 Dl D2 D3 D4 
El 0 0 0 0 E6 2 2 2 2 
E2 0 0 0 1 E7 2 2 2 1 
E3 0 0 1 0 E8 2 2 1 2 
E4 0 1 0 0 E9 2 1 2 2 
ES 1 0 0 0 El0 1 2 2 2 
Surprisingly, the two-stage model also predicts that, under certain circum- 
stances, apparent FR sorting will be obtained. We say “apparent” FR sort- 
ing, because, according to the two-stage model, the processing principles 
going into category construction are identical to those in which FR sorting 
does not obtain. For example, the model predicts that Set A shown in Table 
3 can lead subjects to partition exemplars according to the FR principle 
when asked to categorize the exemplars into two groups. 
Set A differs from the exemplars used in Medin, Wattenmaker, and 
Hampson’s (1987) experiment in that the categories created based on the FR 
principle (e.g., El, E2, E3, E4, E5 vs. E6, E7, E8, E9, ElO) have sufficient 
featurs that do not appear in potential contrasting categories. Therefore, in 
this set, knowing an exemplar has a 0 or a 2 value is sufficient to know to 
which category the exemplar belongs. With these exemplars, the model pre- 
dicts that, no matter which dimension is chosen as the most salient dimen- 
sion, FR categories will be created. 
To illustrate more specifically how the model works, suppose the first 
dimension is chosen as the most salient dimension. Then, El, E2, E3, and 
E4 are classified as one category and E6, E7, E8, and E9 are classified as 
another category. In the second stage, because E5 is more similar to El, E2, 
E3, and E4 than to E6, E7, E8, and E9, it is categorized with El, E2, E3, 
and E4. Similarly, El0 is categorized with E6, E7, ES, and E9. Therefore, 
as a result of the second stage, the model generates FR categories for this set. 
If the two-stage model is an accurate description of the basis for category 
construction, the exemplars with sufficient features should lead subjects to 
create categories based on FR structure. If the task requires subjects to 
create any number of categories, then the two-stage model predicts that 1-D 
categories will be created from Set A, and therefore, the set will be parti- 
tioned into three groups. 
Note that 1-D categories can be created from Set A if subjects, in the sec- 
ond stage, were to use the strategy of assigning the remaining exemplars 
based on similarity along the most salient dimension. The remaining exem- 
plars (ES and ElO) after the initial categorization have the same value (i.e., 
Value 1) along the most salient dimension. Therefore, regardless of whether 
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Value 1 is judged to be more similar to Value 0 or 2, by this strategy they 
both would be grouped into the same category, resulting in 1-D sorting. 
To summarize, the two-stage model argues that people have a strong bias 
to create classical categories based on a single dimension. When this bias 
interacts with various structures of stimulus sets and task demands, differ- 
ent kinds of category structure can be produced. For example, categories 
with FR structure can be created when people are forced to classify exem- 
plars that do not fit the definitions of the classical categories. The current 
experiments contrast predictions of the two-stage model with predictions 
generated by the similarity- and predictability-based clustering models as 
well as Michalski and Stepp’s (1983) descriptive simplicity model. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Although the Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987) studies served to 
motivate the two-stage model, their empirical evidence was more suggestive 
than definitive. The present studies vary the structure of examples in such a 
way as to contrast predictions concerning when FR sorting will be most likely 
to occur. People’s descriptions of their basis for classification will be taken 
as relevant observations, but the primary data come from constructed cate- 
gories. Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson also did not collect subjects’ 
similarity judgments, and therefore, their results cannot be compared with 
predictions of those theories that use similarity as a basis for sorting. The 
present studies use similarity judgments to generate predictions for similarity- 
based clustering models. The similarity judgments also ensure that 1-D sort- 
ing does not emerge simply because there is one dimension that is far more 
salient than the others. 
The current experiment tests alternative category-construction models. 
As noted previously, the two-stage model argues that a fair amount of FR 
partitioning will be observed from Set A because this set has sufficient 
features in the resulting FR categories. When compared with the exempIars 
used in Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987), this set differs from 
their exemplars not only with respect to the structure of exemplars, but also 
with respect to the number of matching features between the two resulting FR 
categories. Consequently, even if there is some increase in FR sorting, it can 
be attributed to the increased between-category difference, and not the struc- 
tural difference. So, in Experiment 1, three more sets of exemplars were 
developed in which within- and between-category similarity and the struc- 
ture of potential categories (Le., existence of sufficient features) was varied. 
These manipulations allowed us to test if the structure of exemplars, rather 
than similarity relations per se, determine the creation of FR categories. 
Four sets of exemplars varying along four dimensions were shown in 
Figure 1 under Sets A, B, C, and D. Sets A and D had more between-category 









El 0000 E6 2222 
E2 0001 E7 2221 
E3 0010 E8 2272 
E4 0100 E9 2722 
ES 7000 El0 7222 
Set B 
El 0000 E6 2222 
E2 0007 E7 2220 
E3 0020 ES 2212 
E4 0100 E9 2022 
ES 2000 El0 7222 
Set D 
El 0010 E6 1227 
E2 0037 E7 2242 
E3 0100 E8 2274 
E4 1300 E9 2422 
ES 3003 El0 4122 
set c 
El 0070 E6 1227 
E2 007 7 E7 2212 
E3 07 00 E8 2271 
E4 7700 E9 2722 
ES 7007 El0 7722 
Figure 1. Abstract notation of Sets A, 8. C, and D. 
difference than Sets B and C, and Sets A and B had more within-category 
similarity than Sets C and D. Two experiments differing in task demands 
were conducted using these sets. 
Experiment la 
The model’s predictions on the four sets were compared with subjects’ sort- 
ing behavior in Experiment la. Before the models’ predictions, specific 
descriptions of materials and procedure used in the experiment are necessary 
to explain how predictions of each model were actually made. 
Method 
Material. Four sets of IO stimuli (Sets A, B, C, and D) were used (see 
Figure 1). The actual dimensions used were size, number of arms, shape of 
edge, and color. In deciding values for each dimension, a pilot study was 
conducted to create roughly equal intervals between the two adjacent values 
on the same dimension (i.e., approximateIy logarithmic steps for a continu- 
ous dimension). Furthermore, an attempt was made to equate the salience 
among the dimensions. 
In Sets A, B, and C, there were three values in each dimension: 3 cm, 5 
cm, and 8 cm for the size dimension; green, red, and yellow for the color 
dimension; four, five, and seven for the number-of-arms dimension; dotted 
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Figure 2. Set A used in Experiment 1 
line, wavy line, and cut line for the shape-of-edge dimension. When all these 
dimensions were combined for Set A, the stimuli looked like starfish as 
shown in Figure. 2. (In Figure 2 three kinds of patterns were used to indicate 
the color dimension.) 
Set D had more values than other sets: For the number-of-arms dimen- 
sion, the values were 4, 5, 6,7, and 8. For the edge dimension, five types of 
edges were developed, which were the three values used in Set A pIus a cross- 
hatched edge and a squiggly edge. For the size dimension, the values were 3 
cm, 4 cm, 5 cm, 6.5 cm, and 8 cm. For the color dimension, the values were 
red, purple, yellow, brown, and green. In assigning these values to the 
abstract notation of the exemplars in Figure 1, Value 0 in the abstract nota- 
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tion was assigned to the smallest (i.e., 4 arms, and 3 cm) or the first value 
(first type of edge or color) in the dimensions, Value 2 in the abstract notation 
was assigned to the largest (i.e., 8 arms, and 8 cm) or the last value (the last 
type of edge and color) in the dimensions. Values 3, I, and 4 in the abstract 
notation were assigned to intermediate values in this order. 
Design and Procedure. Each subject received a set of 10 randomly mixed 
examples that were mounted on 9.3 cm x 7.3 cm cards. Subjects were asked 
to categorize the exemplars into two groups in a way that seemed natural to 
them. They were also told that there could be different numbers of exem- 
plars in the two groups and that there was no .one correct sorting. After they 
created categories, the subjects were asked to write how they came up with 
their partitioning. There were four groups of 20 subjects, each receiving 
either Set A, B, C, or D. 
SuZQects. Subjects were undergraduate students at the University of 
Illinois, participating in partial fulfillment of course requirements for intro- 
ductory psychology. 
Predictions of the Models 
Similarity-Bused Model. A separate experiment was conducted to obtain 
judged overall similarities of the exemplars used in Experiment 1 for predic- 
tions of the similarity-based models. Fourteen subjects were asked to judge 
the overall similarity of each pair of exemplars on a g-point scale, I being 
very different and 9 being very similar. They made similarity judgments on 
all possible pairs within each set. 1 The subjects were asked to consider all 
the dimensions of the exemplars when they made their similarity judgments. 
Four different random orders were used. 
To obtain the similarity-based model’s predictions, we tested the sub- 
jects’ similarity ratings on a SAS clustering program, using the VARCLUS 
procedure. VARCLUS was chosen because it seems to be the most typical 
nonhierarchical clustering algorithm described in the earlier section. Other 
statistical clustering programs perform multidimensional scaling analysis, 
which requires more rigorous assumptions about computing overall simi- 
larities (e.g., feature weighting). We avoided these programs in order to 
minimize any assumptions about similarity computation and to use empiri- 
cally obtained overall similarity as direct input for a clustering program. 
’ In addition to the four sets of exemplars, Set E was included for purposes not relevant to 
the present study and was not a part of Experiment 1 because this set was not diagnostic in 
comparing the four models. The abstract structure of Set E was 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 I,0 0 10.0 1 0 0, 
1000,2222,2223,2232,2322,and3222.Withthefivesetsofexemplars,therewere 
225 possible pairs for similarity judgment. 
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VARCLUS selects prototypes of each category and groups each object with 
each prototype with which it has the highest correlation. After the first 
assignment, the second phase proceeds in which each variable in turn is 
tested to see if assigning it to a different cluster increases the amount of vari- 
ance explained. If a variable is reassigned during this phase, the prototypes 
of the clusters involved are recomputed before the next example is tested. 
We ran VARCLUS on each individual’s similarity ratings and not on 
average ratings because using an average of subjects’ similarity ratings for 
clustering does not necessarily mean that the average subject would produce 
the same clusters. Even when each subject rated similarities in such a way 
that the categories produced by the similarity-based model would be l-D, if 
each subject picked ‘up different dimensions for the basis of similarity judg- 
ment, the average of those ratings could result in FR categories. 
For Sets A and B, every subject’s ratings produced FR clustering. For Set 
C, the ratings of 42.8% of the subjects and for Set D, the ratings of 71.4% 
of the subjects resulted in FR clustering. Therefore, the result shows an 
index of likelihood of obtaining FR partitionings from each set: Sets A and 
B are the most likely, Set D next, and Set C is the least likely to yield an FR 
structure. 
Predictibility-Driven Model: Anderson ‘s Model. The predictions of 
Anderson’s model for the four sets of exemplars are given in Table 4. Because 
the model is sensitive to input order, the simulation was run on 50 trials with 
randomized input orders. The stimuli used in Experiment 1 consist of dis- 
crete values and continuous values, which the model handles differently. 
For continuous values, prior beliefs on means and variance must be speci- 
fied (see Anderson, 1991, for details). As in Anderson (1991), the prior 
means were set to be the halfway point of the range and the prior variance 
was set to be the square of a quarter of the range. In addition, the coupling 
probability, c, was set to be either .3 or .4, which are the values used in all of 
Anderson’s simulations (Anderson, 1990; 1991). The partitionings for each 
coupling parameter are shown under c= -3 and c= .4. 
Table 4 shows the list of various types of partitionings produced by the 
simulation. Each type is separated by parentheses. The numbers in the paren- 
theses indicate the number of examples in each partitioning. For example, 
(1 4 5) indicates that there are three groups in this partitioning, one with a 
single example, one with four, and one with five examples. As it turns out, 
when the partitioning was (5 5), the clusters always corresponded to FR 
categories. When the number of examples does not exceed five, the parti- 
tioning is always subdividing one of the two FR categories. Naturally, when 
the number exceeds five, the partitioning does not accord with the FR prin- 
ciple. The numbers under “%” are the percentages of trials generating each 
partitioning among the 50 trials. To summarize Table 4, FR cateogries were 
96 AHN AND MEDIN 
TABLE 4 





Set A (5 5) 
(1 4 5) 
Set B (5 5) 
(1 4 5) 
(1 0) 




(2 3 5) 
(1 4 5) 
(1 4 ? 4) 
(2 2 3 3) 




(1 4 5) 
(1 1 4 4) 




















(1 4 5) 
(1 13 5) 
(5 5) 
(1 4 5) 
(1 1 3 5) 
(1 0) 
(6 4) 
(1 3 6) 
(1 2 2 5) 
(1 2223) 
(1 1 2 2 4) 
(1 2 3 4) 
(2 3 3 2) 
(2 3 5) 
(5 5) 26 
(1 4 5) 30 
(1 1 3 5) 20 
(1 1 1 3 4) 6 
(1 2 3 4) 2 
(1 1 4 4) 10 
(1 1 2 3 3) 2 
















the modal partitionings for Sets A and B, and some FR sortings emerged for 
Sets C and D, with Set D more likely than Set C to yield FR categories. 
PredictibiZity-Driven Model: COBWEB. For the predictions of COBWEB, 
we tested our data set on COBWEB/3 (McKusick & Thompson, 1990), 
which was basically the same features as COBWEB except that COBWEB/3 
can handle continuous values. Because neither can process examples with 
mixed-dimension types, which is the case in the stimuli used in Experiment 
1, COBWEB/3 has tested on examples with only nominal dimensions. (See 
Experiment 2 for a test on continuous dimensions.) 
As in Anderson’s model, COBWEB (and COBWEB/3) is sensitive to 
input order. For example, when the two most extreme cases of input order 
were used, different hierarchical structures were produced. In one case 
(Input Order l), two prototypes (e.g., 0 0 0 0 and 2 2 2 2) were entered first, 
followed by eight distortions of the two prototypes with two groups of dis- 
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Figure 3. Partitionings of COBWEB for Set A with two input orders. 
tortions evenly intermixed (e.g., 0 0 0 1, 2 2 2 1,O 0 1 0, 2 2 1 2, etc.). In the 
other case (Input Order 2), one prototype was entered first, followed by 
four distortions of the prototype and then the other. prototype was entered, 
followed by four distortions of the prototype (e.g., 0 0 0 0, 0 0 0 1, 0 0 1 0, 
. ..2222.222 1,22 12,. . .etc.). These two input orders led to different 
types of partitionings as shown in Figure 3. In Figure 3, dots indicate each 
node and the most ,abstract node in a hierarchy is placed at the left side of 
the hierarchy. Nodes at the same level also have the same vertical position in 
the figure. 
For a more thorough test, we added a randomization procedure to COB- 
WEB/3 and tested it on 50 trials with randomized input order. We examined 
only the types of partitionings at the most abstract level in the hierarchy 
because more specific levels had many more than two partitionings, which 
may not be comparable to the current experimental results. At the most 
abstract level, FR partitionings were almost always produced from Sets A 
and B (92% of the trials from Set A and 88% from Set B). For Set’C, COB- 
WEB produced 28 types of partitionings with three or more than three cate- 
gories in each type. Naturally, there was no FR partitioning from Set C. 
From Set D, 24 types of partitionings were produced and except for the FR 
partitioning (26% of the trials), 23 types of partitionings had three or more 
than three categories. In sum, COBWEB’s prediction was the same as 
Anderson’s model; for Sets A and B, FR categories were the modal parti- 
tionings, and the likelihood of producing FR sorting for Set C was the least 
of all four sets. 
CLUSTER/2. For CLUSTER/2, dimension types have to be specified. 
Dimensions 1 and 2 were linear whereas 3 and 4 were nominal. The param- 
eters used were the default values that are most frequently used in their sys- 
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tern.’ With these parameters, CLUSTER/Z generated three clusterings of 
each set of exemplars, differing in the number of clusters in each clustering. 
Because the system has no preference among these clusterings, only those 
clusterings with two clusters will be used for comparison with the results 
obtained in the experiment, in which subjects were asked to categorize the 
exemplars into two categories. 
Table 5 shows the categorization made by CLUSTER/2 for each set of 
exemplars. As shown here, CLUSTER/2 did not generate any FR sorting. 
All the resulting partitionings were 1-D. Furthermore, the system generated 
categories of very different sizes, which seems psychologically implausible. 
(Note that previous experiments showed that people had a tendency to create 
equal-sized categories, Handel & Imai, 1972; Imai, 1966). Although we 
have not fully explored the parameter space, it is very unlikely to produce 
FR categories by adjusting parameters, because the most important cluster- 
ing criterion of this system is simplicity of description, and FR categories 
cannot be described in simple terms. 
Two-Stage Model. The two-stage model predicts that FR categories will 
be created only from the sets with sufficient features in the potential FR 
categories (i.e., Sets A, C, and D in Figure 1). The reason that sufficient 
features are necessary for the creation of FR categories can be illustrated by 
examining Set B. This set does not have sufficient features in the resulting 
FR categories and therefore, according to the two-stage model, FR cate- 
gories will not be created from this set. 
Suppose the first dimension was selected as the most salient dimension in 
Set B. Then El, E2, E3, and E4 will be placed into Category 1, and ES; E6, 
E7, ES, and E9 will be placed into Category 2 in the first stage. The remain- 
ing example, ElO, will be put in Category 2 if subjects categorize it based on 
overall similarity, or it will be put in either Category 1 or 2 if subjects cate- 
gorize it based on the similarity along the most salient dimension. Which- 
ever strategy is used, the resulting categories are not FR categories because 
E5, which has more similarity to Category 1 than Category 2, is placed into 
Category 2 in the first stage. 
There can be some differences among the sets with sufficient features. 
Sets C and D are less likely to produce FR categories than Set A because 
overall similarities between the remaining exemplars and the initially created 
categories are smaller in Sets C and D. Also, Sets A, C, and D can produce 
1-D sorting if subjects sort the remaining examples based on similarity only 
along the most salient dimension. 
a The default values were-Mink = 2, Maxk = 4, covertype = disjoint, Hl = 3. H2= 2, H3 = 3, 
Cbase = 2, probe = 2, NIDspeed = fast, maxheight = 99, minsize = 4, beta = 3 .O, LEF = [(sparse- 
ness= 0.3) (simplicity=0.3)]. See Michalski and Stepp, 1983, for more detaik on the parameters. 
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TABLE 5 
Category Construction 
Made by CLUSTER/2 
Category A Category 0 






































Summary of Predictions. So far, specific predictions of each model on 
the four sets of exemplars have been described (see Table 6 for the summary 
of these predictions). All of the models, with the exception of CLUSTER/2, 
predict FR sorting from Set A. Both the similarity-based model and the 
predictibility-driven model predict that Set C is less likely to produce FR 
categories than Set B. The two-stage model predicts the opposite effect 
because Set B does not have sufficient features. This prediction for Set B 
provides the sharpest contrast between the two-stage model and the similarity- 
based and predictibility-driven models. 
loo AHN AND MEDIN 
TABLE 6 


















FR or Others 






Note. FR=fomity resemblance sorting; 1 -D= unidimensional sorting: Others=other 
types of sorting. 
TABLE 7 



















Note. Numbers indicate percentages of sorting types in each condition in each set: FR= 
family resemblance sorting, I-D=unidimensional sorting, Others=other responses. 
Results 
Scoring Method. For Sets A, B, and C, subjects’ sortings were considered 
as 1-D if all exemplars in one of the categories had the same value along any 
dimension. For Set D, two types of sortings were considered as 1-D; either if 
one of the two categories had only one value in a dimension, or if one of the 
two categories had all the exemplars with two adjacent values on a continu- 
ous dimension and one of the adjacent values was an extreme value on the 
dimension. The two FR categories for each set are shown in Figure 1 as two 
columns, each column representing one of the two categories. Subjects’ 
sortings were considered as FR only when they were the same as the ones in 
this figure. 
Analysis of Types of Sorting. Table 7 shows a summary of the results for 
each set. As predicted by most of the models, a fair amount of FR sorting 
was observed in Set A. For this set, 55% of the subjects produced FR cate- 
gories, and 45% of the subjects produced 1-D sorting. 
The most critical test in comparing the previous category-construction 
models is between Sets B and C. For Set B, all of the subjects produced 1-D 
sorting. For Set C, 35% of the subjects produced an FR sorting, 55% pro- 
duced 1-D sorting, and 1Ocrlo produced other responses. The Fisher’s exact 
test (two-tailed) was used to test the difference between Sets C and B in the 
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proportions of FR sorting. The difference was highly significant, p< .OOl. 
The difference between Set C and Set A was not significant, x2(1, N = 40) = 
1.616, p> .lO. 
From Set D, 20% of the subjects produced FR categories, 65% of the 
subjects produced 1-D categories, and 15% created other kinds of sorting. 
The proportion of a FR sorting from Set D was not significantly different 
from Set C, x2(1, N= 40) = 1.129, p> .lO, but was significantly different 
from Set A, x2(1, N= 40) = 5.227, p< .05. The Fisher’s exact test (two- 
tailed) indicated that differences between the proportion of an FR sorting 
from Set D and that from Set I3 was marginahy significant, p = .053. 
Analysis of Protocols. Subjects’ descriptions of how they came up with 
their categories were also analyzed. Only the descriptions of those who gen- 
erated FR categories are reported here because the main interest of the cur- 
rent experiments is whether various models accurately describe how people 
create FR categories. 
Almost all of the subjects who created FR categories used only one or 
two dimensions in category constructions. Thirteen subjects simply men- 
tioned one dimension they used (e.g., “large vs. small”) and did not explain 
what they did with the medium value in the dimension. Four subjects men- 
tioned two dimensions they used (e.g., “more defined and larger” vs. “less 
defined and smaller”). Three subjects mentioned three dimensions but the 
descriptions were not clear enough (e.g., “colors first, shapes second, dot 
configurations last”). Two subjects’ descriptions were too vague to be 
classified. One subject’s description was exactly the same as the two-stage 
model’s description of the category-construction process. The description 
was: “First I broke down into three groups by number of points on each 
object. Second, I broke down the middle group by size.” No subject pro- 
vided a description of sorting by overall similarity. 
Discussion 
In the Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson experiments (1987), no FR sort- 
ing was observed when independent dimensions were used and when sub- 
jects were free to create categories of any size. In the present experiment, 
between-category similarities were increased by developing exemplars in 
such a way that the categories based on the FR principle had sufficient fea- 
tures. For the first time, a fair amount of FR sorting was observed froni 
stimuli consisting of independent features (i.e., Set A). This result was pre- 
dicted by the two-stage model, the similarity-based model, and the predicti- 
bility-driven model. However, the explanations for the FR sorting were 
different across the models: According to the similarity-based model and 
the predictibility-driven model, it was due to increased between-category 
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difference. Considering the decreased proportions of FR sorting in Set D 
relative to that in Set A where the between-category difference is constant, 
this explanation may be plausible. 
According to the two-stage model, however, the FR sorting was associ- 
ated with the presence of sufficient features and the decreased proportion of 
FR sorting in Set D simply derives from the decreased overall similarity of 
remaining exemplars to initially created categories. To test these two explana- 
tions, Sets I3 and C were compared. Set C had less within-category similarity 
than Set B, but it had sufficient features in the resulting FR categories. The 
results clearly supported the two-stage model’s prediction: The creation of 
FR categories depended on the particular structure of exemplars, and not 
on overall similarity. 
The two-stage model can also explain the 1-D sortings from Sets A, C, 
and D in terms of the different strategies used in the second stage of category 
construction. Unlike the similarity-based model or Anderson’s model, the 
two-stage model claims that the 1-D sortings resulted, not from decreased 
overall similarity, but from the strategy of assigning the remaining exemplars 
based on similarity only along the most salient dimension. If the 1-D sortings 
were simply due to the strategies used in the second stage, all of the subjects 
should produce an FR partitioning when a task does not allow subjects to 
use the strategy of classifying the remaining exemplars based on the similarity 
along the most salient dimension. Experiment lb tests how task demands 
can change the strategy used in the second stage of category construction. 
Experiment lb 
In Experiment lb, subjects were asked to create two equal-sized categories. 
For Set A, the two-stage model predicts that this task demand will keep sub- 
jects from using the strategy of assigning remaining exemplars based on the 
similarity along the salient dimension. More specifically, after the first 
stage, there are four exemplars in each category and two exemplars that are 
unclassified. If subjects assign both of the two remaining exemplars to one 
of the groups, it will result in unequal-sized categories. Consequently, the 
new task demand will force them to classify the remaining exemplars based 
on their overall similarity to each category, resulting in the creation of FR 
categories. 
On the other hand, for Set B, the new task demand would not affect the 
type of sorting. Although 16 of 20 subjects in Experiment la created un- 
equal-sized 1-D categories, it was predicted that forcing them to create 
equal-sized categories would still lead to the creation of 1-D categories. 
According to the two-stage model, the 1-D sorting from Set B in Experiment 
la is a consequence of the first stage. Suppose the first dimension were the 
most salient to a subject, resulting in a category with El, E2, E3, and E4 
and a category with E5, E6, E7, E8, and E9 after the first stage. Assigning 
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the remaining example (ElO) to the category with four exemplars’ (El, E2, 
E3, and E4) in order to create equal-sized categories will not produce FR 
categories because the category that initially had five exemplars had E5, 
which was more similar to the contrasting category. 
The other models do not provide clear predictions of the effects of the 
new task demands. For the similarity-based model, it had already predicted 
that from Set B there would be two equal-sized FR categories. Similarly, the 
two predictibility-driven models already produced two equal-sized cate- 
gories most of the time and those categories were always FR categories. It 
was impossible to make more precise predictions of how these two models 
would behave differently when they were forced to create equal-sized cate- 
gories because these two models do not have a feature to specify the number 
of categories to be created. It seems clear, however, that there is no reason 
for the models to switch from FR sorting to I-D sorting for Set B just be- 
cause they were forced to make categories equal-sized. For CLUSTER/2, 
allowing complex descriptions of categories might lead to creation of equal- 
sized categories, but the change seems to be against the spirit of the model. 
To summarize, none of the other models make the same prediction as the 
two-stage model under this particular task demand. 
Method 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment la except for the instructions 
on the category size. Subjects were told that they should create two cate- 
gories and that there should be an equal number of exemplars in each cate- 
gory. Only Sets A and B from Experiment la were used. Two groups of 10 
subjects received either Set A or Set B. 
Results and Discussion 
The results were straightforward. As predicted, all subjects who received 
Set A produced FR categories, whereas all subjects who received Set B pro- 
duced 1-D sorting. These results are consistent with the idea that the 1-D 
sorting created from Set A in Experiment la was attributable to various 
strategies used in the second stage, whereas the 1-D sorting from Set B in 
Experiment la derived from the structure of the exemplars. 
General Discussion of Experiment 1 
Summary of Results 
Experiment 1 compared the two-stage model, the similarity-based model, 
the predictibility-driven model, and CLUSTER12 in predicting when FR 
categories will be created. In Experiment la, the FR partitionings were 
obtained in substantial numbers. Effects of patterns of within- and between- 
category similarity were contrasted with the structural property of whether 
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or not sufficient features would be present in potential FR categories. The 
results showed that the structure of the exemplars was the critical determinant 
of the creation of the FR categories, as predicted by the two-stage model. 
In Experiment lb, when one of the strategies was prevented, which was 
assumed to lead to the generation of 1-D sorting in Set A, all of the subjects 
produced the FR categories. None of the subjects produced the FR cate- 
gories when the same task demand was imposed on Set B. Again, the two- 
stage model predicts the effect because it implies that 1-D sorting derives 
from the first stage for this stimulus set. The results clearly show that FR 
partitioning can be obtained depending on the task demands and the struc- 
ture of the given exemplars. 
Generality of Procedure 
In Experiment 1, the sorting task was constrained in that subjects were 
asked to create only two categories. According to the two-stage model, if 
any number of categories are allowed, subjects would not bother to go 
through the second stage and carry out only the first stage, creating 1-D 
categories regardless of structures of the categories. In an experiment not 
reported in this article, this instruction was given to subjects. No subject 
created FR categories using any of the exemplar sets. Instead, the vast 
majority (70%) created I-D categories and the rest created categories that 
were essentially 1-D (see Ahn, 1990b, Experiment 3 for details.) 
Generality of Stimulus Types 
In Experiment 1, the stimuli consisted of two nominal or quahtative dimen- 
sions and two continuous or numerical dimensions. It is not yet clear how 
various types of dimensions might have interacted with the category-con- 
struction processes. Furthermore, the analysis of 1-D sorting indicated that 
not all dimensions were used to the same degree as a basis for 1-D sorting. 
The number-of-arms dimension was used most often (72.5% of 1-D sorting 
across all four sets of exemplars). Given this unbalanced figure, one may 
argue that the unequal salience of dimensions might have discouraged sub- 
jects from using overall similarity for sorting. However, the similarity judg- 
ments obtained in Experiment la suggest that the number-of-arms dimension 
was not the only dimension considered. 
An alternative explanation is that a continuous dimension might have 
been used more often in dividing exemplars into two categories simply 
because the exemplars with an intermediate value on the continuous dimen- 
sion could easily be’placed with either of the two extreme values. In other 
words, it might be easier to group five-armed objects with either four-armed 
or seven-armed objects than to group yellow objects with green or red ob- 
jects. The generality of the results across different types of stimuIi was tested 
in Experiment 2. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to obtain converging evidence for the two-stage 
model by varying the types of stimuli. One set of stimuli consisted of only 
continuous dimensions (continuous condition) and the other set consisted 
of only nominal dimensions (nominal condition). In Experiment 2, only 
Sets A, B, and C were used because Set D was not diagnostic in differen- 
tiating various clustering models. 
As in Experiment la, subjects in Experiment 2 were asked to create two 
categories of any size. The materials and procedure used in Experiment 2 
will be presented first, followed by the predictions of the various models for 
this experiment. 
Method 
Materials. Two types of stimuli were used: one consisting of continuous 
dimensions, and the other consisting of nominal dimensions. Set A consisting 
of continuous dimensions is shown in Figure 4. The exemplars are arranged 
in such a way that the upper five exemplars and the lower five exemplars 
each represent one of the resulting FR categories. The four dimensions and 





The height of a rectangle of a constant 2.54-cm width was one of the 
following three values: 3.18, 4.44, or 5.72 cm. 
The shape on the top of the rectangle was a trapezoid of constant height 
(1.27 cm) and constant base width (4.44 cm); the shape was varied by 
varying the top width: 30, 1.57, or 3.50 cm. 
A white arrow of constant (1.90 cm) length was superimposed on the 
bottom left of the rectangle and rotated about .30 cm from the left side 
and .64 cm from the base of the rectangle; the orientations of the arrow 
were 5 O, 45 “, or 85 o clockwise from the horizontal. 
The brightness of the rectangle varied in three steps. 
Set A, consisting of nominal dimensions, is shown in Figure 5. They 
are arranged in such a way that the upper five exemplars and the lower five 
exemplars each represent one of the two resulting FR categories. The four 
nominal dimensions were: (1) overall shape, (2) shape of a top part, (3) 
shape of an inner part, and (4) types of pattern. The three values used in 
each dimension can easily be seen in Figure 5. 
Using the same values and the same dimensions, Sets C and B were also 
developed for both the continuous dimensions and the nominal dimensions. 
In total, there were six sets of stimuli (two types of stimuli x three sets of 
stimuli). 
~ ~~~ ~ 
:: :...:.:: 
Figure 4. Materials used in continuous condition in Experiment 2. 
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Fiaure 5. Materials used in nominal condition in Experiment 2. 
Procedure. The same procedure as in Experiment la was used. Each sub- 
ject received one of the six sets of examples. For each set, there were 20 sub- 
jects, resulting in 120 subjects in total. Subjects were undergraduate 
students at the University of Illinois, participating in partial fulfillment of 
course requirements for introductory psychology. 
Predictions of Models 
Two-Stage Model. Changing the types of dimensions could affect the 
strategy used on the second stage. In advance of the experiment, no precise 
prediction could be made on the general differences between the two condi- 
tions for Sets A and B. One possible difference may appear from Set C for 
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the following reasons: As shown in Figure 1, there were four l’s on each 
dimension in Set C, whereas there were three O’s and three 2’s. If a dimen- 
sion is nominal, people would tend to choose 1 as a primary feature for a 
category, simply because the Value 1 is the most frequent feature in the 
exemplars. However, when a dimension is continuous (e.g., size), not fre- 
quency but actual value (e.g., small, medium, or large) seems to determine 
which values would be used as defining values for each category. In Experi- 
ment 1, an intermediate value (e.g., medium size) on a continuous dimen- 
sion was always assigned for the Value 1. In that case, although the Value 1 
was the most frequent value in Set C, it was not chosen as a primary value in 
the first stage, but instead, extreme values (i.e., 0 and 2) were chosen as 
defining features for each category. According to the two-stage model, 
when the Values 0 and 2 were chosen as primary values, FR categories can 
be created from Set C. But if the Value 1 was chosen as a primary value for 
any of the two categories to be created, then there is no way of producing 
FR categories by classifying the remaining examples (the ones with either O’s 
or 2’s) in the second stage. The Value 1 is more likely to be selected as 
the defining value if the primary dimension selected in the first stage is 
nominal than if it is continuous. Consequently, for Set C, subjects would 
create fewer FR categories in the nominal condition than in the continuous 
condition. 
Similarity-Based Model. To derive predictions for the similarity-based 
model, we collected similarity judgment as follows. The procedure was the 
same as the one described in Experiment 1 for the prediction of the similarity- 
based model Subjects were undergraduate students at the University of 
Michigan, participating in partial fulfillment of course requirements in in- 
troductory psychology. There were 12 subjects in the nominal condition and 
11 subjects in the continuous condition. 
The individual subjects’ similarity ratings for each pair were entered as 
input to SAS clustering programs, using the VARCLUS procedure. For the 
continuous condition, every subject’s ratings produced FR clustering from 
Sets A and B. For Set C, the ratings of 63.6% of the subjects resuIted in FR 
clustering. The rest of the partitionings were either 1-D (1 subject) or other 
responses (e.g., grouping El, E2, E3, and E4 in Figure 1 together and the 
rest of the exemplars together). For the nominal condition, ratings of all 
subjects except for one produced FR categories from Set A. From Set B, 
ratings of 58.4% of the subjects produced FR partitioning and the rest pro- 
duced 1-D partitioning along the size dimension. From Set C, FR partition- 
ings were reduced to 25% and the rest were either 1-D (41.6%) or other 
types (33.4%). 
To summarize, the similarity-based model predicted almost 100% of FR 
sorting for Set A in both conditions and for Set B in the continuous condi- 
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TABLE B 
Predictions of Anderson’s (1991) Model on the Continuous Condition 
c= A c=.3 











Set C (5 5) 12 
(1 4 5) 20 
(1 2.3 4) 14 
(2 3 5) 12 
(2 2 3 3) 10 
(2 4 4) 8 
(3 3 4 4 
(2 2 2 4) 2 
(1 225) 2 
(1 333) 2 
(1 1 4 4) 2 
(2 2 6) 2 
(7 3) 2 
(1 9) 2 
(6 4) 2 
(1 261) 2 
(1 2 7) 2 
(5 5) 
(5 5) 
(1 4 5) 
(1 1 4 4) 
(1 2 2 2 3) 
(1 2 2 5) 
(2 3 5) 
(1 2 3 4) 
(1 45) 
(1 1 2 2 2 2) 
(2 4 4) 
(4 3 3) 
(2 2 3 3) 
(1 1 2 2 4) 
(1 3 3 3) 
(2 2 2 4) 


















tion. Also, in both conditions, Set B would be more likely to result in FR 
categories than Set C. 
PredictibiCity-Driven Model: Anderson ‘s Model. The simulation of 
Anderson’s (1991) model was run 50 times with randomized input orders 
using two coupling parameters (either .3 or .4) as in Experiment 1. For the 
nominal condition, the input was three distinctive values on four dimen- 
sions as specified in Figure 1. For the continuous condition, prior belief on 
means and variances was set based on means and ranges of the actual 
values. (For the brightness dimension described in Experiment 2b, the 
values were the number of dots within the same area.) Tables 8 and 9 show 
the model’s predictions for the continuous and the nominal conditions, 
respectively. 
For the continuous condition, a majority of partitionings from Sets A 
and B were FR categories regardless of the coupling parameter. From Set C, 
most partitionings consisted of more than two categories. Also they were of 
various kinds, none of which were generated more than 25% of the trials. 
Still, most of the partitionings were not against the FR principle in that they 
were splitting FR categories into smaller categories. 
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TABLE 9 








(5 5) 32 (5 5) 6 
(1 1 5 3) 16 (1 4 5) 28 
(1 1 1 5 2) 14 (1 1 1 2 5) 14 
(1 451 10 (1 1 1 3 4) 12 
(1 1 3 1 1 3) 6 (1 1 3 5) 12 
(1111123) 6 (1 1 1 1 2 4) 10 
(1 1 14 3) 6 (1 1 1 1 3 3) 6 
(1 1 1 1 2 4) 6 (1 1 4 4) 6 
(1 1 4 4) 2 (11111122) 4 
(11111122) 2 (1111123) 2 
(5 5) 16 (5 5) 20 
(1 4 5) 16 (1 4 5) 22 
(1 1 3 5) 10 (1 1 3 5) 12 
(1 16 3) 8 (1111123) 12 
(1 9) 8 (1 1 125) 8 
(1 1 1 4 3) 6 (1 1 1 3 4) 6 
(1 1 4 4) 6 (11111122) 6 
(1 1 1 2 5) 6 (1 1 1 1 3 3) 4 
(1111123) 4 (1 1 4 4) 4 
(1 1 1 1 2 4) 4 (1 1 1 1 2 4) 2 
(1 1 8) 4 (1 1 8) 2 
(1 3 6) 4 (4 6) 2 
(4 6) 4 
(1 1 1 1 3 3) 2 
(11111122) 2 
(1 2 2 2 3) 24 (1 12222) 100 
(1 1 2 2 4) 20 
(1 1 2 2 2 2) 16 
(1 225) 16 
(1 2 3 4) 10 
(2 3 5) 6 
(2 2 3 3) 4 
0 45) 2 
(2 2 6) 2 
The partitionings from the nominal condition were more unstable; there 
were about 10 different types of partitionings from all three sets except 
when the coupling parameter was .3 for Set C. In addition, a majority of 
partitionings consisted of singleton categories and more than two thirds of 
the partitionings were of more than two categories. These categories were 
mostly either FR categories of split-up FR categories. Because subjects in 
Experiment 2 were asked to create two categories, the coupling parameter 
was increased from Anderson’s usual value, -3 or .4 to .5 in order to force 
A TWO-STAGE MODEL OF CATEGORY CONSTRUCTION 111 
the model to generate two categories. The resulting categories were FR 
categories on all trials for Set A, 94% of the trials for Set B, and 58% of the 
trials for Set C. 
To summarize, there was no 1-D sorting under any circumstances. Also, 
the coupling parameters and input order greatly affected the types and the 
number of partitionings. When the coupling parameter was adjusted in 
order to produce the same type of partitioning unaffected by input order, 
the FR partitionings were produced more frequently from Sets A and B 
than from Set C. 
Predictibility-Drive Model: COB WEB. The predictions of COBWEB 
were generated by running COBWEB/3 on 50 randomized trials using actual 
values used in Experiment 2. In short, COBWEB/3 produced much more 
than 10 different types of partitionings from all three sets and none of them 
were FR. Because the assumptions of COBWEB/3 on continuous dimen- 
sions have not yet been extensively investigated, these predictions may not 
be generalizable as COBWEB’s predictions. The predictions on nominal 
dimensions were discussed in Experiment 1. To summarize, Sets A and B 
resulted in FR partitionings and Set C did not result in any FR partitionings. 
CLUSTER/2. CLUSTER/2 was tested on the two types of dimensions 
using the same default parameters as in Experiment 1. The predictions for 
the nominal condition were the same as for Experiment 1. The predictions 
for the continuous condition were also 1-D sorting as shown in Table 10. 
Summary of Predictions. So far, we have described the predictions of 
various clustering models on stimuli consisting of either only nominal dimen- 
sions or only continuous dimensions. To summarize, the two-stage model 
predicts that if sufficient features exist in the resulting FR categories and 
they are the modal features, subjects will be able to create FR categories. 
However, if the resulting FR categories do not have sufficient features as in 
Set B, there cannot be any FR categories. The similarity-based model and 
Anderson’s model both predict that the likelihood of obtaining FR categories 
would be the greatest for Set A, next greatest for Set B, and least for Set C. 
In addition, bofh models predict that the stimuli with continuous dimen- 
sions would be more likely to produce FR categories than the stimuli with 
nominal dimensions. COBWEB predicted no 1-D sorting from any set. 
CLUSTER/2 predicted 1-D sorting in all sets. 
Results 
Analysis of Types of Sorting. Table 11 summarizes the results from Ex- 
periment 2. For the continuous condition, the results replicated Experiment 
la. FR sortings were obtained most often from Set A (55%), and next from 
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TABLE 10 
Category Construction Made by 
CLUSTER/P for the Continuous Condition 
Category A Category B 




























Set A Set B Set C 
55 0 20 
45 95 60 
0 5 20 
35 0 0 
60 95 80 
5 5 20 
Note. Numbers indicate percentages of sorting types in each condition in each set. FR= 
Family resemblance sorting; I-D=unidimensional sorting; Others=other responses. 
Set C (20%). There were no FR sortings for Set B. The Fisher’s exact test 
(two-tailed) indicated that the difference between Set A and Set B was 
highly significant (pc .OOl), but that the difference between Set C and Set B 
was not significant (p= .lO). Also, the difference between Set A and Set C 
was significant, x2(1, N=40) = 5.227, pc .05. 
The proportions of 1-D sorting were 45010 for Set A, 95% for Set B, and 
60% for Set C. The difference between Sets A and C was not significant, 
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x*(1, iV=40) = 1.600, p< .lO. But the Fisher’s exact test (two-tailed) indi- 
cated that the difference between Sets B and C with respect to 1-D sorting 
was significant, p < -05. Therefore, the nonsignificant difference between 
Set B and Set C with respect to FR sorting may derive from other responses 
from Set C. 
For the nominal condition, 35% of the subjects who received Set A pro- 
duced an FR sorting. None of the subjects who received either Set C or Set 
B produced an FR sorting. Instead, the overwhelming majority of subjects 
(95% in Set B and 80% in Set C) produced 1-D sorting. The Fisher’s exact 
test (two-tailed) indicated that the difference between Set A and either Set B 
or Set C was significant, p-c -01. 
Proportions of FR sorting in the two conditions were compared. Although 
proportions of FR sorting from the nominal condition seem less than those 
from the continuous condition, none of the differences was significant. For 
Set A, the difference between the nominal condition and the continuous 
dimension with respect to FR sorting was not significant, x2(1, N=40) = 
1.616, pc .lO. For Set C, the Fisher’s exact test (two-tailed) indicated the 
difference was not significant, p = -106. Proportions of 1-D sorting in the 
two conditions were also compared. The only significant difference between 
the two conditions were obtained from Set C (60% for the continuous con- 
dition and 95% for the nominal condition), pc .05. 
Analysis of Z-D Sorting. For 1-D sortings, we examined which two values 
were placed together in the same category. (Recall that with three values, 
e.g., 0, 1, and 2, 1-D sorting consists of placing all exemplars with the same 
value, e.g., 0, in one category and all exemplars with either of the remaining 
values, e.g., 1 or 2, in the other category.) This analysis was carried out to 
examine why there was no FR sorting from Set C in the nominal condition. 
In all sets in both conditions except for Set C in the nominal condition, all 
of the subjects created 1-D categories by placing all exemplars with 0 (or 2, 
for some subjects) in one category and placing all exemplars with the re- 
maining values in the other category (e.g., 2 and 1 or 0 and 1). In contrast, 
in Set C, 12 of 16 subjects who generated 1-D categories placed all exem- 
plars with 1 in one category and placed all exemplars with the rest of the 
values (i.e., 0 and 2) in the other category. Therefore, the modal feature 1 in 
Set C, was frequently chosen as the primary dimension on the first stage, 
which prevented subjects from generating FR categories. 
Analysis of ProiocoZs. No subject’s description was consistent with the 
FR principle. In the continuous condition, the protocols of 15 subjects who 
produced FR categories were as follows. Two subjects mentioned only a 
single dimension, 6 subjects mentioned two dimensions, 4 subjects men- 
tioned three dimensions. Three subjects’ descriptions corresponded precisely 
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with the two-stage model’s predictions (e.g., “First, I compared the little 
arrow. Then I compared the shading.“) 
In the nominal condition, the protocols of 7 subjects who produced FR 
categories were as follows. Two subjects mentioned only one dimension, 
and 2 subjects mentioned two dimensions. Three subjects’ descriptions 
matched exactly with the two-stage model’s predictions (e.g., “First, I 
looked for the shapes that were most similar. Then there were two cards 
left. I put those where their color was most similar.“). 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 using different types of stimuli were generally 
consistent with the results from Experiment la. Regardless of whether 
dimensions were nominal or continuous, FR sorting was obtained most fre- 
quently from Set A and no FR sorting was obtained from Set B. 
The proportions of FR sorting from Set C varied depending on the type 
of stimuli. When continuous dimensions were used, the results were consis- 
tent with Experiment la: There were more FR sortings from Set C than 
from Set B (although the difference was only marginally reliable). 
When nominal dimensions were used, no FR sorting from Set C was ob- 
tained as predicted by the two-stage model. The values overlapping across 
two FR categories (i.e., the Value l’s) were not intermediate ones and there 
were more exemplars with these values than the other two (i.e., the Values 
O’s and 2’s). This explanation for 1-D sorting in the nominal condition was 
supported by details of 1-D sorting. The reason why there was no FR sort- 
ing in Set C consisting of nominal dimensions seems to be simply because 
the Value 1, which is the most frequent value in Set C, is used as the primary 
value on the first stage. 
The proportion of FR sorting from Set A was somewhat less when nomi- 
nal dimensions were used than when continuous dimensions were used. One 
possible reason is that nominal dimensions are usually parts (e.g., different 
types of legs, different types of skin, etc.) and as Tversky and Hemenway 
(1984) argued, people may be more reluctant to separate objects with the 
same part than to separate objects with the same property, such as size. In 
this case, subjects might have preferred the strategy of classifying the re- 
maining exemplars based on the most salient dimension. 
An additional experiment was carried out to test whether the particular 
strategy used in the second stage could explain the difference between the 
nominal condition and the continuous condition. As in Experiment lb, 9 
subjects were asked to create two equal-sized categories from Set A consisting 
of nominal dimensions (see Experiment lb for the rationale for this proce- 
dure). Eight of the 9 subjects created an FR sorting, showing that the sub- 
jects in the nominal condition used the strategy of classifying the remaining 
exemplars based on the primary dimension more often than the strategy of 
assigning remaining exemplars based on the overall similarity. 
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None of the other clustering models can explain the results. The similarity- 
based model fails because it predicts more FR sorting from Set B in the con- 
tinuous condition than from Set C. Also, the model has no way of explaining 
1-D sorting from Set B by almost all subjects and 1-D sorting from Set C by 
almost two thirds of subjects in both conditions. The predictability-driven 
model clearly fails in explaining our results because few of its partitionings 
were 1-D sorting. CLUSTER/2 cannot explain the results because the sys- 
tem does not produce FR categories. 
Overall, Experiment 2 demonstrated the generality of the two-stage 
model across different types of stimuli. The FR sorting that was observed 
fits better with the two-stage model than with alternative clustering models. 
The overall pattern of results is consistent with a two-stage an analysis 
where the second stage is affected by stimulus types, category structure, and 
task demands. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Comparison with Previous Models 
Theories of conceptual structure suggest that natural categories are fuzzy 
categories with an FR structure in which members in the same category are 
more similar to each other relative to members in the contrast categories. 
Previously, it was assumed that category representations mirrored this fuzzy 
structure and that people would prefer to construct FR categories. This 
approach was taken by the similarity-based model and the predictibility- 
driven model. Consequently, they predicted that the likelihood of FR sorting 
would increase as within-category similarity and between-category differ- 
ence increase. This hypothesis, however, has not been supported by the 
current experiments because subjects tended to sort exemplars on a single 
dimension. 
The new model proposed in this article sheds a different light on this 
issue: Even when people prefer classically defined categories, an FR struc- 
ture may be obtained. If the values used for 1-D sorting do not appear in the 
contrast category, then sorting through two stages can result in FR parti- 
tioning. The current results clearly showed that sufficient features in 
resulting FR categories were the critical factors in producing FR categories 
and not the overall similarity. 
The current results were also inconsistent with CLUSTER/Z, a cluster- 
ing model emphasizing simplicity as a clustering criterion because for all 
sets of exemplars, CLUSTER/2 predicted 1-D sorting and could not explain 
why FR sorting was obtained in certain sets. 
Are the Stimuli and Task Demands Realistic? 
The similarity-based model and predictibility-driven model were initially de- 
veloped for incremental clustering, and hence, it might be unfair to compare 
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their predictions with our results where sorting was done simultaneously. 
We have already discussed justifications for comparing results from simul- 
taneous sorting tasks with results from sequential sorting tasks but whether 
FR sorting will emerge under sequential clustering is, of course, an 
empirical issue. 
One may also argue that the current experimental stimuli and tasks are 
too artificial in that subjects were forced to create two categories from a set 
of very homogeneous examples. This argument does not seem to be convinc- 
ing. We have tested Anderson’s rational model, which has been shown to 
explain a considerable variety of data obtained in numerous categorization 
experiments (Anderson, 1990). It was found that the model created two or 
more categories using the same coupling parameters that have been applied 
to these other experiments. In short, our stimuli do not seem to be out of 
line with other categorization experiments where the predictibility-driven 
models have been applied successfully. 
Another possible objection is that the task is artificial because the subjects 
were asked to create only two categories. Prescribing a number of categories 
to be created may not be too artificial because in natural settings, prior 
knowlege may also indicate how many categories should be created. 
Creating two categories may be an especially common phenomenon: Mental 
patients can be diagnosed as either normal or abnormal, friends can be 
classified into introverts and extroverts, and so on. Still, in the current ex- 
periment, this task was imposed not because it is a natural phenomenon but 
rather because the two-stage model predicts that creation of FR structure 
occurs only when there are two categories to be created. As noted earlier, 
when subjects were allowed to create any number of categories, they did not 
create FR categories. Creation of FR structure occurs as an interaction of 
special task demands (i.e., creating two categories) and the structure of ex- 
amples. The purpose of the special task demand was simply to demonstrate 
this aspect of the model. 
The generality of our findings may be constrained by conflicting results 
obtained by Smith (1981) with different stimulus materials. The general 
consensus from developmental studies is that children’s sorting is based on 
overall similarity, whereas adults’ sorting is based on a single feature (Imai 
& Garner, 1968; Smith & Kemler, 1977). Smith (1981), however, attributed 
these findings to the use of only a small number of dimensions {e.g., two or 
three) in the stimuli. Smith argued that if examples had many dimensions 
(four in her experiments), adult subjects would also sort the examples based 
on overall similarity. Smith found results consistent with this prediction. 
The results conflict with ours because we also used four dimensions, yet did 
not obtain much FR sorting. Furthermore, the four continuous dimensions 
used in Experiment 2 were essentially the same as the ones in Smith’s experi- 
ment except that we used the brightness dimension instead of the color 
dimension. 
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A systematic comparison between Smith’s experiments and ours revealed 
four differences in experimental procedures and materials. First, in our ex- 
periments the subjects were always asked to create two categories, whereas 
in Smith’s experiments, the subjects could create any number of categories 
as long as there were at least two groups. However, this difference does not 
explain similarity classifications in Smith’s experiment because when sub- 
jects were asked to create any number of categories as discussed in Experi- 
ment 1, they still did not produce FR sorting (Ahn, 199Ob). Second, in 
Smith’s experiments, the differences between adjacent values do not seem 
to be psychologically as great as the ones used in the current experiments. In 
her experiments, the differences between the two adjacent values were too 
small to be easily detected (e.g., 0.63cm in the height dimension). If one 
does not look at these exempIars very carefully, some examples look almost 
identical, resulting in increased likelihood of sorting based on overall simi- 
larity. A third difference is that the structure of exemplars used in Smith’s 
experiments did not distinguish sorting based on overall similarity and sort- 
ing based on two dimensions. Finally, the dimensions used in Smith’s expe- 
riment were somewhat integral (Garner, 1974). In her stimuli, subjects 
could have treated the height and the width as a single dimension such as 
“the overall shape.” 
A further test was conducted to examine whether Smith’s results were 
due to these differences (Ahn, 1990b). In this experiment, the structure of 
stimuli was exactly the same as that in Smith’s experiment. In Ahn’s experi- 
ments, however, when subjects were asked to carefuh’y examine the materials 
or when the one-step dimensional differences were increased, modal sorting 
responses were based on a single feature. So, this result implies that subjects 
simply overlooked the dimensional differences and sorted based on combined 
values. Furthermore, protocols of subjects who produced similarity sorting 
mentioned only one or two dimensions as a basis of their sorting, indicating 
that their apparent similarity sorting might be, in fact, sorting based on a 
single (e.g., “overall shape”) or conjunctive features. Consequently, the 
apparent discrepancy between our experiments and Smith’s experiments 
disappears when we took a closer look: People still prefer unidimensional 
sorting regardless of the number of dimensions. 
Related Evidence and Ideas 
Several researchers have presented evidence and ideas related to the current 
data and the two-stage model. Medin, Wattenmaker, and Michalski (1987) 
observed similar behavior when subjects were asked to induce a set of rules 
from preclassified exemplars. They showed subjects pictures of trains that 
were preclassified into two groups and asked the subjects to come up with a 
rule that could be used to distinguish them. A frequent observation was that 
people first came up with an overly generalized rule (a rule which also 
covered some nonmembers), and then modified the rule to eliminate the 
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counterexamples by using negative properties. For example, a person might 
notice that all trains in our group have a triangle load but that two trains in 
the other group do also. In that case, the person might add to the initial rule 
another feature that does not apply to the contrasting trains, such as, “tri- 
angle load in nonlast car.” If people came up with a rule that does not cover 
all the members, they patchedup the rule by using disjunctive features. For 
example, if a person realized that only one group of trains had two cars but 
that this rule was not complete, then the person might notice that the re- 
maining trains had jagged tops and came up with the rule, “two cars or a 
jagged top.” 
The processing strategies found in their experiments are described in a 
Patch model (Bettger, 1989; Medin, Wattenmaker, & Michalski, 1987). 
According to this model, people first select a feature by which most of the 
exemplars in one category can be described. This initially selected rule is 
patched up in various ways to be a coherent and consistent rule. The pro- 
cesses used in the Patch model are similar to the two-stage model. 
In a similar vein, Michalski (1989) proposed a two-tiered concept repre- 
sentation. In this representation, concepts consist of the first tier, called the 
Base Concept representation and the second tier, called the Inferential Con- 
cept interpretation. The Base Concept representation consists of typical 
properties of a concept in an explicit, comprehensible, and efficient form. 
This tier seems analogous to the information used in the first stage of the 
two-stage model. The Inferential Concept interpretation consists of infer- 
ence rules and meta-knowledge that define allowable transformations of the 
concept under different contexts, and handle special cases and exceptional 
instances. The second tier seems analogous to the second stage of the two- 
stage model. 
Markman (1989) made a similar point suggesting that FR structures could 
result from stretching classically defined categories to include exemplars 
that lack defining features of a category but fit better in that category than 
in any other. Of course, natural categories are not constructed at a single 
setting in some close analog of our experimental procedures. Clearly, the 
two-stage model might not be the only method for creating an FR structure. 
Perhaps FR categories can be obtained in knowledge-rich domains. If ex- 
emplars, differing in surface structure, share a hidden or deeper property, 
then 1-D sorting based on this hidden property can result in FR structure at 
the surface levels. Some researchers call these kinds of hidden properties 
“theories” (Markman, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985) and it has been argued 
that FR structures could be consequences of implicit theories that form the 
basis for categorization. For example, in Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hamp- 
son’s (1987) experiments, subjects created FR categories from examples such 
as “Susan is outgoing, energetic, entertaining, and a daydreamer, Carrie is 
vigorous, active, courteous, and talkative, Miranda is sad, self-conscious, 
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inhibited, and a daydreamer, Dawn is withdrawn, solemn, soft-spoken, and 
spirited, etc.” The subjects’ protocols (e.g., one group’s is ‘Lfun to be with” 
and the other group’s is “not the sort of person to take to a party”) indicate 
that their FR sorting is based on a dimension underlying the features used to 
describe the examples. 
The two-stage model is a purely syntactic model and the current experi- 
ments used materials only from knowIedge-poor domains in which people 
do not have prior knowledge on the domain-specific goal of category con- 
struction, relationships among features, and so on. The category-construc- 
tion process in knowledge-rich domains might be quite different as observed 
in the Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson (1987) experiment (also see 
Ahn, 1990a, 1991). The two-stage model might not be literally translated to 
these situations: Even in knowledge-rich domains, however, one might still 
expect to see not a mirroring of structure, but a base (or core) plus noise 
strategy where people impose a certain amount of structure by discovering 
underlying theories. 
Conclusions 
The two-stage model successfully predicts when FR sorting will or will not 
occur. People seem to like structures with more organization than is present 
in the examples. But then, given the demands of the task, they have to 
figure out what to do with the examples that do not fit the simple struc- 
ture. Processes associated with the second stage yield categories where the 
defining features become converted to typical features. In the same way, FR 
categories may represent a compromise between a preference for highly 
structured concepts and the necessity of mapping concepts onto real-worId 
examples. 
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